

Modern American Political Dynasties

***A Study of Power, Family,
and Political Influence***

Kathleen A. Gronnerud and Scott J. Spitzer, Editors



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Contents

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Introduction

Scott J. Spitzer

This study of modern American political dynasties reveals much about American political history. In these pages, we find that the historical arc of each political family—its emergence, rise, and its fading from public life—embraces centrally important features in the development of 20th-century American politics. These include: the power of the party political machines and their subsequent disruption by reforms in the early part of the century; the remarkably successful confrontation of racial hierarchy in the South by the nonviolent civil rights movement; the rise of the conservative movement in the second half of the century and its transformation of the modern Republican Party; and the modern Democratic Party's struggles to redefine its agenda, as the New Deal coalition confronted a new set of political challenges, quite different from its original agenda in addressing the economic deprivation of the Great Depression. Yet even as tracing their individual stories reveal much about the nation's political character, the very existence of these political dynasties challenges basic democratic assumptions underlying the American experiment.

The American Revolution and the Constitution

There is an unspoken tension in American democratic politics, between an emphasis on the power of everyday citizens and an appreciation of expertise and professionalism in our elected leaders. Although Americans claim nearly universal support for the democratic principle of popular sovereignty (the citizens' right to choose their leaders), the nation's political history illustrates the long-standing practice of established leadership expertise. These two are not necessarily opposed to one another—a nation can certainly have democratically elected leaders who enjoy strong support among the public and who are also refined in their political skills, possessing specialized expertise in one or more areas of relevant policy. But noteworthy tensions exist in

The Rockefeller Dynasty

Richard Skinner

To call the Rockefellers a political dynasty is to actually understate their influence. Although comparisons across times and cultures are challenging, they are probably the wealthiest nonroyal family that has ever existed. They created Standard Oil, one of the signature corporations of the Industrial Revolution. The Rockefellers also built one of the first major philanthropic foundations and endowed one of the nation's leading research universities, the University of Chicago. The Rockefellers defined over a century of American life. John D. Rockefeller Sr., the father of the family fortune, became a leading symbol of the Gilded Age and the greatest villain of the Progressive era. John D. Rockefeller Jr. used the "scientific charity" of the Progressive era to remake the family reputation. John D. Jr.'s five sons—the so-called brothers—embraced the optimism of what Henry Luce, publisher of *Time* and *Life*, in 1941 called "The American Century," imagining that business, government, and philanthropy could together solve any problems facing the United States. The Rockefeller family thus exemplified a mingling of private and public power that alarmed both the Left and the Right. The great fortune that the Rockefellers accumulated through business, made them giants in philanthropy, and gained them entry to politics. But that wealth was not able to overcome suspicions of centralized power that run deep in American life.

Although the Rockefellers would go on to loom large in public life, they only embraced elective politics after achieving prominence in business and politics. John D. Rockefeller Sr. distrusted politicians, especially those who attacked his business practices while taking his contributions. John D. Rockefeller Jr. gave lavishly to the Republican Party, but thought politics an unsuitable endeavor

for someone with so controversial a surname. But two of Rockefeller Jr.'s five sons embraced public life. Nelson Rockefeller was the first in his family to enter into national politics, serving in appointive positions under three consecutive presidents, was elected to four terms as governor of New York, and served as vice president. After an unlikely midlife move to Arkansas, Winthrop Rockefeller was elected twice as governor. Both men could point to great accomplishments in office, but their careers ended in frustration. Nelson openly sought the presidency twice, and flirted with running two other times, but never captured his prize in large part because of an incompatibility with his own political party. Winthrop was brought down by his own personal demons. In the following generation, John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV was elected as governor and senator by the people of West Virginia despite his own shallow roots in the state. Win Paul Rockefeller served more than a decade as lieutenant governor of Arkansas and was about to seek his father's office as governor when he fell victim to cancer. Once Jay Rockefeller retired in 2015, the nation lacked a Rockefeller in elected office for the first time in more than a half century.

The Founder: John D. Rockefeller Sr.

John D. Rockefeller was certainly the wealthiest American of his time, probably the wealthiest American of all time, and very likely the wealthiest person who ever lived. Rockefeller was the principal founder of Standard Oil, which dominated the marketing and refining of petroleum in the United States from the 1870s until its breakup in 1911 due to an antitrust case. Due to his great wealth and his perceived ruthlessness in acquiring it, John D. Rockefeller was perhaps the most despised man of his era.

Perhaps the quintessential figure of the Gilded Age, Rockefeller became arguably the principal villain of the Progressive era. The power of Standard Oil helped make the distrust of big business a highly salient issue in the 1880s and 1890s, leading to the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Revelations of the vast sums given by Standard Oil to the Republican Party helped spark the first movement for campaign finance reform. Ida Tarbell's *The History of the Standard Oil Company* (1904), an expose of Rockefeller's business methods, was the quintessential "muckraking" work of the Progressive era.

Rockefeller supported the Republican Party for his entire adult life—he cast his first vote for president in 1860 for Abraham Lincoln. Rockefeller's strong convictions against slavery and in favor of temperance were only strengthened by his marriage to Laura Spelman, whose parents were abolitionists involved with the Underground Railroad. The couple remained loyal to their chosen causes, becoming the leading supporters of the Anti-Saloon League and prominent funders of African American education initiatives. Rockefeller made his first financial contribution to a Republican presidential candidate in 1880,

The Rockefeller Dynasty

Rockefeller Political Dynasty Family Tree

1. John Davidson Rockefeller Sr., 1839–1937
President and founder of Standard Oil, philanthropist
Married Laura C. Spelman
Six children including John D. Rockefeller Jr.
2. John D. Rockefeller Jr., 1874–1960
Married Abby Greene Aldrich (daughter of Senator Nelson W. Aldrich), then Martha Baird Allen
Six children including John D. Rockefeller III, Nelson, and Winthrop
3. Nelson A. Rockefeller, 1908–1979
Governor of New York, 1959–1973
Vice president, 1974–1977
Married Mary Todhunter Clark, then Margaretta Large Fittler
Seven children
4. Winthrop Rockefeller, 1912–1973
Governor of Arkansas, 1967–1971
Married Barbara Sears, then Jeannette Edris
One son: Winthrop Paul
5. Winthrop Paul Rockefeller, 1948–2006
Arkansas lieutenant governor, 1996–2006
Married Deborah Cluett Sage, then Lisenne Dudderar
Eight children
5. John "Jay" D. Rockefeller IV, 1937–, son of John D. Rockefeller III
West Virginia House of Delegates, 1967–1969
West Virginia secretary of state, 1969–1973
Governor of West Virginia, 1977–1985
U.S. Senate, 1985–2015
Married Sharon Percy
Four children

when he backed James Garfield. He remained a loyal donor to the GOP for the remainder of his life. President William McKinley was a favored recipient of contributions (his campaign manager Mark Hanna had attended high school with Rockefeller).

But Rockefeller overall did not care much for politicians. Standard Oil had long kept many of them on its payroll, and Rockefeller sometimes complained that politicians often took his money and then denounced him to win votes. Rockefeller had contributed to the campaigns of Theodore Roosevelt, but as president, Roosevelt repaid his generosity by initiating the lawsuit that dissolved Standard Oil. Unlike some of his political rivals, Roosevelt was not uniformly hostile to big business. He preferred the regulation of trusts versus breaking them up, and voluntary constraint versus long, costly court cases. However, by November 1906, Standard Oil vice president John D. Archbold (by then the company's de facto chief executive, given that the aging Rockefeller now devoted himself primarily to philanthropy) managed to alienate the president through his inflexibility and heavy-handed tactics. In an era where Americans had become suspicious of the power of big business, Standard Oil had made itself an obvious target.

The Justice Department initiated antitrust proceedings against Standard Oil. The case would drag on for nearly five years. Roosevelt's successor, William Howard Taft, had a friendlier relationship with the Rockefellers. But that did not make him any less committed to the Standard Oil prosecution. In May 1911, the Supreme Court ruled that Standard Oil had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and ordered that it be broken up into 34 separate companies. Ironically, the breakup made John D. Rockefeller even wealthier, given that the combined net worth of the new companies soon far exceeded that of Standard Oil.¹ Rockefeller not only helped create the modern corporation with Standard Oil, but he also created modern philanthropy. As his fortune exploded in the 1880s and 1890s, Rockefeller became concerned with finding more systematic ways of giving it away. He disliked "handouts" to the less fortunate and had grown weary of being dunned for contributions by potential recipients. Frederick T. Gates, secretary of the American Baptist Education Society, shared many of Rockefeller's concerns. He became Rockefeller's principal philanthropic and business adviser. They began shifting Rockefeller's giving away from one-time gifts to specific recipients toward broader efforts at social reform, particularly focused on education and public health.

After the turn of the century, Rockefeller and Gates, now joined by John D. Rockefeller Jr., began to envision a charitable foundation of unprecedented scale. In 1913, the Rockefeller Foundation was chartered under New York State law. If John D. Rockefeller Sr. was the principal villain of the Progressive era, the foundation he created nevertheless was a quintessentially Progressive enterprise: technocratic, impersonal, optimistic, and aimed at social reform without threatening the status quo. Gone was the era of episodic charity aimed

The Rockefeller Dynasty

at the donor's pet causes; the age of "scientific" philanthropy administered by experts had arrived.

The Philanthropist: John D. Rockefeller Jr.


Aside from contributing enormous sums to the Republican Party, John D. Rockefeller Jr. (known as Junior within the family) was not involved deeply in politics.² Still, Junior was central to the rise of expertise in American life, an evolution with profound consequences for government. He funded pioneering think tanks such as the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the National Bureau for Economic Research. He followed his father in pursuing "scientific charity," building the Rockefeller Foundation into a model for other philanthropic endeavors.

In 1914, national guardsmen massacred about two dozen people at a miners' encampment in Ludlow, Colorado; the victims were striking against Rockefeller-owned Colorado Fuel & Iron. The incident sparked wide outrage against the family, arguably surpassing even the decades of resentment of the power of Standard Oil. John D. Rockefeller Jr. worked with labor relations expert W. L. Mackenzie King (later prime minister of Canada) to develop a new management scheme for Colorado Fuel & Iron. This began a long interest in labor relations by the Rockefeller family. Junior also sparked the clan's interest in conservation issues, helping to establish Acadia, Grand Teton, and Great Smoky Mountains National Parks. The Rockefeller Foundation funded the Bureau of Social Hygiene, which supported research on birth control and sex education, foreshadowing John D. Rockefeller III's role in advocating population control. The statistician Beardsley Ruml used Rockefeller funds to build the Social Science Research Council. The Rockefeller Foundation was also involved in education, public health, and the arts.

Junior did much to rehabilitate the family image. It is difficult to imagine his children and grandchildren pursuing political careers without his efforts to make the Rockefeller name synonymous with good works rather than with greed. But commentators noted that Junior pioneered corporate public relations as well as organized philanthropy. Not only did the Rockefeller charities promote good will for the family, but they rarely seriously threatened the status quo. The combination of vast wealth, political connections, scientific expertise, and savvy public relations could be simultaneously exciting and threatening; populists of both the Left and the Right tended to suspect the Rockefellers of dark doings.

The Brothers' Generation

By the 1940s, Junior's five sons (known as the "brothers") were ready to take over the family institutions. (Their sister, Abby Aldrich Rockefeller, most



John D. Rockefeller and John D. Rockefeller Jr., c. 1915. (Library of Congress)

stayed aloof from family affairs.) Early on, Nelson established himself as the dominant brother, showing aside his reserved older brother John D. III and humiliating his troubled younger brother Winthrop. Laurance was always the brother most loyal to Nelson, while youngest child David established himself as the family intellectual, earning a PhD in economics. With the Rockefeller Foundation under the management of philanthropic professionals, the new generation created the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in 1940 to coordinate their own giving.

The brothers were not always close, but they did present a shared worldview that contrasted to their father's Victorian caution.

They were quintessential figures of the “greatest generation” and of the Cold War. They displayed a faith in American global leadership, grounded in a confidence in the nation's institutions that now seems quaint. In contrast, they also displayed deep concern about threats facing the nation, whether posed by communism, by the “population explosion,” or the “revolution of rising expectations” in the developing world.³ More than their conservative father, they embraced activist government, especially in partnership with business. But they carried on Junior's confidence in “scientific” expertise and his preference for orderly methods of social change.⁴

If their father avoided overt political involvement, the brothers embraced public life. Nelson and Winthrop spent much of their adult lives in government, both in appointed and elected office. David turned down repeated offers to hold public office but was engaged in political affairs behind the scenes for decades, serving as an informal adviser to presidents and chairing the Council on Foreign Relations for a decade and a half. John D. III and Laurance kept lower profiles, but their philanthropy made them experts in their fields to

an extent that several presidents sought their opinions. All remained at least nominal Republicans but often found themselves ill at ease with their party's rising right wing.

As the brothers returned from wartime service in 1945, they began to assert themselves against their father's control. Nelson remodeled their wing of the family offices on the 56th floor of 30 Rockefeller Plaza. Showing his father around the new space, Nelson asked him, “Isn't this impressive?” His father supposedly responded, “Nelson, whom are we trying to impress?” The brothers were in a hurry to impress the world. They soon assumed control of the family enterprises, and the brothers became an object of popular fascination, emblematic of the optimism of postwar America and the confidence that, with enough money and blue-ribbon commissions, all social problems were solvable.

Perhaps no enterprise more typified the Rockefeller brothers than the Special Studies Project, launched by Nelson Rockefeller after he left the Eisenhower administration in 1956. Meant to define the problems and opportunities facing the United States and to formulate a national purpose, the project was composed of seven blue-ribbon panels featuring such luminaries as *Time/Life* founder Henry Luce, RCA founder David Sarnoff, and retired general Lucius D. Clay, as well as brothers John D. III and Laurance. Henry Kissinger (future national security adviser and U.S. secretary of state), already emerging as a foreign policy intellectual in his midthirties, served as director. The findings were published in 1958–1960.⁶⁷ Not surprisingly, the project called for the United States to play a more active role in foreign affairs, to embrace economic globalization, and to increase assistance to the developing world. In domestic policy, the study called for the federal government to increase its management of the economy and to improve the nation's educational system.

But the study is best remembered for its recommendations for military policy, which were rushed to publication three years earlier, following the Soviet launch of the satellite *Sputnik*. Reflecting the worldviews of both Henry Kissinger and Nelson Rockefeller, the report urged huge increases in military spending in order to match the Soviets. It also promoted a doctrine of “counterforce” that broke with the policy of “massive retaliation” backed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Rather than responding to every Soviet encroachment by threatening complete annihilation, the United States could employ a range of options, including intervening in regional conflicts and engaging in “limited” nuclear war. The panel's recommendations were widely seen as a criticism of President Dwight Eisenhower's cautious foreign policy, including his unwillingness to boost military spending if it risked larger budget deficits. The study influenced both parties' platforms in 1960 and helped shape the foreign policy of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.^{8,9}

Nelson Rockefeller Goes to Washington

Nelson Rockefeller burst onto the public stage in the 1930s, through his work on the iconic family properties of the era in New York City: the Museum of Modern Art (his mother's pet project) and Rockefeller Center (his father's). In 1939, he assumed the presidencies of both entities, landing him on the cover of *Time* at the age of 30. His involvement with the family investments in Mexico and Venezuela fueled a lifelong passion for Latin America. After France fell to Germany in June 1940, concern grew over the Axis Powers' influence in the Western Hemisphere. Rockefeller proposed creating a presidentially appointed position to orchestrate U.S. policy in Latin America. President Franklin D. Roosevelt named Rockefeller as coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in August 1940. Rockefeller quickly used his connections, political skills, and fortune to turn an ill-defined position into a center of power in wartime Washington. Aware of his vulnerability to bureaucratic rivals elsewhere in the federal government (particularly in the State Department), Rockefeller assembled a legion of patrons who ran the ideological gamut from Vice President Henry Wallace on the Left to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover on the Right. His ties to media figures such as Luce and CBS president William S. Paley also served him well. Rockefeller attracted numerous young and able subordinates willing to work punishing hours.^{10,11}

While the coordinator's position was initially justified by the need to fight Axis economic influence in Latin America, the office soon became most identified with American propaganda efforts. The coordinator's office produced *En Guardia*, a propaganda magazine for a Latin audience. Leading film and music stars toured Central and South America. The popular newsreel series *The March of Time* began a Spanish-language edition. Most famously, at Rockefeller's behest, Walt Disney produced two cartoons set in Latin America.

After Pearl Harbor, Rockefeller expanded his activities to include the Institute of Inter-American Affairs. The new project engaged in joint projects with Latin American governments to pursue ventures in agriculture and public health. Both the Isolationist Right and the fellow-traveler Left (even in the era of the U.S.-Soviet alliance, he could barely disguise his militant anticommunism) treated Rockefeller with suspicion, but his reputation in Latin America swelled. A network of coordination committees made up of U.S. expatriates gave Rockefeller eyes and ears in every Latin American capital and only further annoyed the diplomatic corps.

After FDR's reelection in November 1944, Edward Stettinus replaced Cordell Hull as secretary of state. Hull had been a fierce bureaucratic rival of Rockefeller, but Stettinus complied with FDR's wish that Rockefeller be named assistant secretary of state for Latin America. In his new post, Rockefeller was consumed by a drive to build a regional security alliance in the Western Hemisphere, a project distrusted by those who preferred the global arrangements


epitomized by the nascent United Nations. He also found himself preoccupied with the United States' complicated relationship with Argentina, which had remained neutral for most of the war and was widely seen as being sympathetic to the Axis Powers. His endless machinations at the inaugural United Nations Conference, held in San Francisco in 1945, annoyed many of his colleagues at State, who found him obsessed with Latin American opinion, and too willing to accept Argentina's repressive military regime as a partner against communism. But Rockefeller did win a provision in the U.N. Charter that allowed for regional security alliances and was later used as a justification for NATO. His time at the State Department was running short, however. FDR's death meant that Rockefeller lost a longtime patron. When President Harry Truman replaced Stettinus with James Byrnes in August 1945, the new secretary of state quickly pushed out Rockefeller.¹²

Nelson's return to New York after the war marked his establishment as the dominant figure in the Rockefeller family. Not only did he assume control of the family institutions, he emerged as a leading citizen of New York City. Most notably, he was deeply involved in the effort to win the competition for the location for the headquarters of the newly founded United Nations. Nelson Rockefeller returned to public life in 1950 when President Truman named him chairman of the International Development Advisory Board, which supervised a new program of assistance to the developing world. But Rockefeller found his opinions ignored and was outmaneuvered in bureaucratic warfare by his friend and fellow plutocrat W. Averell Harriman. Rockefeller resigned in the fall of 1951.

Nelson Rockefeller and Dwight Eisenhower

In 1952, a group of East Coast moderates organized to draft General Dwight Eisenhower for the Republican presidential nomination.¹³ Nelson Rockefeller was personally close to many figures involved in the Citizens for Eisenhower movement, most notably his uncle Winthrop Aldrich, president of the Chase National Bank. But Rockefeller was slow to publicly identify himself with Dwight Eisenhower; when Rockefeller finally offered his services after the Republican Convention, New York governor Thomas Dewey froze him out of any meaningful role in the campaign. (Dewey was often skeptical of Rockefeller's political ambitions; when consulted about a possible gubernatorial run, he offered to help Rockefeller become postmaster in New York City.) After the election, President Eisenhower named Rockefeller chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization. PACGO made a series of recommendations, most notably suggesting that the hodgepodge of entities that composed the Federal Security Agency be turned into a cabinet-level Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).

After Eisenhower signed legislation creating HEW, he appointed Overta Culp Hobby, a Houston newspaper publisher and prominent supporter, as its



New York governor Nelson Rockefeller campaigning for the Republican presidential nomination, July 11, 1968. (Library of Congress)

first secretary. Hobby asked Rockefeller to serve as her undersecretary. She had limited expertise in her department's policy areas, and Rockefeller was widely seen as HEW's dominant figure. Eisenhower also lacked interest in or knowledge of domestic social policy, allowing Undersecretary Rockefeller to play a role far greater than his title would suggest. Still, he often found himself squeezed between a Right that thought he was going too far and a Left that thought he was too cautious. Thwarting the wishes of the Republican Right, Rockefeller managed to persuade Eisenhower to approve an expansion of Social Security. But a scheme to expand private health insurance ran into steep opposition from both ends of the ideological spectrum.¹⁴ It did not take long for Nelson Rockefeller to realize that HEW was a backwater in an administration focused on foreign policy. In the fall of 1954, he joined the Eisenhower White House in a position as an administrative assistant on foreign policy. This vaguely defined position fit Rockefeller's tendencies toward the optimistic and the nebulous, but not surprisingly led him into frequent conflict with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Rockefeller sponsored two gatherings of leading Cold War thinkers at the marine corps base in Quantico, Virginia, which urged much greater military spending, and thereby annoyed the many fiscal conservatives in the administration. Although Eisenhower proposed his "Open Skies" initiative at the Geneva superpower summit (Khrushchev rejected it), Rockefeller's year as a foreign policy strategist proved frustrating, and he resigned in December 1955.


Rockefeller's experience in the Eisenhower administration resembled his two previous forays into federal service. He could attract talented subordinates, often with an academic pedigree, to his service (his ability to place some of them on the family payroll did not hurt). But observers often thought that Rockefeller was using his fortune and connections to make up for his own intellectual shortcomings. Eisenhower quipped that "he is too used to borrowing brains instead of using his own."¹⁵ Rockefeller had an affinity for broad, dreamy concepts but lacked the ability to implement them effectively or to sell them to the skeptical. Eisenhower said of Rockefeller, "He has one hundred ideas. One of them may be brilliant . . . it's worthwhile to have him around because that one idea is worth the ninety-nine that aren't."¹⁶ Rockefeller was often intrigued by schemes for business-government cooperation that the Left thought too friendly to business and the Right thought constituted too much "big government." During World War II, Rockefeller often confronted opposition from a Left that thought he was too obsessed with communism, but his major opposition in the Eisenhower years usually came from a Right that perceived him as free-spending and utopian.¹⁷

During his years under Franklin Roosevelt, Rockefeller's good ties with the White House often helped him triumph in bureaucratic warfare, but he never established quite the same relationship with Eisenhower, despite repeated exercises in blatant sycophancy. He worked better with Vice President Richard Nixon, who shared his desires for a more aggressive foreign policy and a more pragmatic domestic policy.

Governor Rockefeller

Rockefeller's frustrating sojourns in three consecutive presidential administrations convinced him of the need to seek elective office on his own terms. In the mid-1950s, leading New Yorkers sought to recruit him to run for mayor, the mid-1950s, leading New Yorkers sought to recruit him to run for mayor, governor, or U.S. senator. One of those New Yorkers was state Republican chairman Judson Mohrhouse. After Rockefeller told him he had no interest in serving in the Senate, Mohrhouse began to lay the groundwork for a gubernatorial bid in 1958. Every 20 years, New York State voters got to decide whether to call another constitutional convention. Governor Averell Harriman (D), a friend and sometimes rival of Rockefeller, agreed to appoint him as chairman of a temporary commission to consider issues that might face such a convention. The commission itself turned out to be for naught, since New Yorkers rejected a convention in a November 1957 vote. Still, Rockefeller used the commission to educate himself on state issues, to assemble a knowledgeable policy staff, and to elevate his public profile.

Although Rockefeller lacked ties to the county bosses who dominated the New York Republican Party, Mohrhouse and Assemblyman Malcolm Wilson (who would go on to be Rockefeller's lieutenant governor) were happy to put



New York governor Nelson Rockefeller campaigning for the Republican presidential nomination, July 11, 1968. (Library of Congress)

first secretary. Hobby asked Rockefeller to serve as her undersecretary. She had limited expertise in her department's policy areas, and Rockefeller was widely seen as HEW's dominant figure. Eisenhower also lacked interest in or knowledge of domestic social policy, allowing Undersecretary Rockefeller to play a role far greater than his title would suggest. Still, he often found himself squeezed between a Right that thought he was going too far and a Left that thought he was too cautious. Thwarting the wishes of the Republican Right, Rockefeller managed to persuade Eisenhower to approve an expansion of Social Security. But a scheme to expand private health insurance ran into steep opposition from both ends of the ideological spectrum.¹⁴ It did not take long for Nelson Rockefeller to realize that HEW was a backwater in an administration focused on foreign policy. In the fall of 1954, he joined the Eisenhower White House in a position as an administrative assistant on foreign policy. This vaguely defined position fit Rockefeller's tendencies toward the optimistic and the nebulous, but not surprisingly led him into frequent conflict with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Rockefeller sponsored two gatherings of leading Cold War thinkers at the marine corps base in Quantico, Virginia, which urged much greater military spending, and thereby annoyed the many fiscal conservatives in the administration. Although Eisenhower proposed his "Open Skies" initiative at the Geneva superpower summit (Khrushchev rejected it), Rockefeller's year as a foreign policy strategist proved frustrating, and he resigned in December 1955.

Rockefeller's experience in the Eisenhower administration resembled his two previous forays into federal service. He could attract talented subordinates, often with an academic pedigree, to his service (his ability to place some of them on the family payroll did not hurt). But observers often thought that Rockefeller was using his fortune and connections to make up for his own intellectual shortcomings. Eisenhower quipped that "he is too used to borrowing brains instead of using his own."¹⁵ Rockefeller had an affinity for broad, dreamy concepts but lacked the ability to implement them effectively or to sell them to the skeptical. Eisenhower said of Rockefeller, "He has one hundred ideas. One of them may be brilliant . . . it's worthwhile to have him around because that one idea is worth the ninety-nine that aren't."¹⁶ Rockefeller was often intrigued by schemes for business-government cooperation that the Left thought too friendly to business and the Right thought constituted too much "big government." During World War II, Rockefeller often confronted opposition from a Left that thought he was too obsessed with communism, but his major opposition in the Eisenhower years usually came from a Right that perceived him as free-spending and utopian.¹⁷

During his years under Franklin Roosevelt, Rockefeller's good ties with the White House often helped him triumph in bureaucratic warfare, but he never established quite the same relationship with Eisenhower, despite repeated exercises in blatant sycophancy. He worked better with Vice President Richard Nixon, who shared his desires for a more aggressive foreign policy and a more pragmatic domestic policy.

Governor Rockefeller

Rockefeller's frustrating sojourns in three consecutive presidential administrations convinced him of the need to seek elective office on his own terms. In the mid-1950s, leading New Yorkers sought to recruit him to run for mayor, the mid-1950s, leading New Yorkers sought to recruit him to run for mayor, governor, or U.S. senator. One of those New Yorkers was state Republican chairman Judson Mohrhouse. After Rockefeller told him he had no interest in serving in the Senate, Mohrhouse began to lay the groundwork for a gubernatorial bid in 1958. Every 20 years, New York State voters got to decide whether to call another constitutional convention. Governor Averell Harriman (D), a friend and sometimes rival of Rockefeller, agreed to appoint him as chairman of a temporary commission to consider issues that might face such a convention. The commission itself turned out to be for naught, since New Yorkers rejected a convention in a November 1957 vote. Still, Rockefeller used the commission to educate himself on state issues, to assemble a knowledgeable policy staff, and to elevate his public profile.

Although Rockefeller lacked ties to the county bosses who dominated the New York Republican Party, Mohrhouse and Assemblyman Malcolm Wilson (who would go on to be Rockefeller's lieutenant governor) were happy to put

their own extensive networks to work on his behalf. Wilson and Rockefeller launched a memorable tour of upstate New York in the summer of 1958, where the Fifth Avenue plutocrat proved to be a smashing success on the region's main streets. Meanwhile, many leading Republican moderates in New York City began to rally behind Rockefeller. His main opponent, former Republican National Committee chairman Leonard Hall, was initially seen as Eisenhower's choice. But both Eisenhower (privately) and Nixon (publicly) encouraged Rockefeller to run.

Many Republican insiders were happy to back Rockefeller without much thought to what kind of governor he might be. They assumed that he would lose: with the country mired in recession, 1958 was shaping up to be a Democratic year. Although the Republican legislature had blocked most of his proposals, Harriman was a popular, if uninspiring, governor. He had sought the Democratic presidential nomination in 1952 and 1956, and most assumed he would run again in 1960. If Republican prospects looked grim, a Rockefeller at the top of the ticket would at least guarantee an adequate campaign budget. Moreover, Rockefeller's riches and connections did not hurt in wooing the GOP's county bosses and small-town gentry. His opponents quit the race before the state convention, and Rockefeller was nominated by acclamation.

If the Republican Convention was a lovefest, the Democratic Convention descended into factional warfare. In New York City, a long-running battle between the party bosses and liberal reformers was nearing its peak. Harriman found himself caught between the factions, forced to accept boss-chosen candidates for senator and attorney general. Liberals were enraged, while many machine politicians were less than smitten with the aristocratic Harriman. Harriman's wife Marie commented on the Tammany triumph by declaring, "They gave ole Ave a real Philadelphia rat-f*cking!"¹⁸ Despite his own backing by machine bosses like J. Russell Sprague of Nassau County, Rockefeller attacked Harriman as a tool of party politics.

Rockefeller ran an intense, high-energy campaign that contrasted sharply with Harriman's low-key style. Donations from Rockefeller and Rockefeller associates swelled his campaign war chest to bursting, allowing him to greatly outspend the Democrats. Rockefeller followed a centrist path, playing down his Republican label, and reaching out to traditionally Democratic minority groups. Harriman eventually turned to tying Rockefeller to the decreasingly popular President Eisenhower, who was at his public nadir in the midst of a recession, and especially to the disliked Vice President Nixon. When Nixon came to New York to stump for Republicans, Rockefeller appeared to distance himself, before finally appearing in person with him at the end of his visit. As a result, the then-liberal *New York Post*, whose owner Dorothy Schiff was personally close to Rockefeller, endorsed Harriman. But when the governor appeared to imply that Rockefeller, a loyal supporter of Jewish causes, was

unsympathetic to Israel, the *Post* took back its endorsement in a front-page editorial by Schiff. Even as Democrats triumphed nationwide, Rockefeller won in a 10-point landslide, performing unusually well for a Republican in New York City, and with African Americans and Jews. The Rockefeller name had finally been redeemed by the voters.^{19,20}

Rockefeller eventually won the governorship four times. His campaigns proved highly influential and memorable. This scion of wealth, whose life had been spent at great remove from most citizens, turned out to be a natural campaigner. He was a master of both the "old" politics of streets and backrooms, and of the "new" politics of money and television. Rockefeller's personal campaigning excited frenzies comparable to that experienced by pop stars, whether he was visiting small-town diners, marching in ethnic parades, or chomping blintzes in a Lower East Side restaurant. His shouts of "Howaya" and "Hiya, fella" quickly dispelled voters' suspicions that he was an aloof aristocrat. Meanwhile, he ran the New York Republican Party as an absolute monarchy, using money (his and the state's) and patronage to win the loyalty of the state's clubhouses. His friendly relationships with union leaders and Democratic pols often made them less-than-enthusiastic supporters of Rockefeller's opponents. But Rockefeller ruled the state's living rooms as well as its backrooms. His vast campaign spending overwhelmed the Democrats. He was one of the first state-level politicians to embrace the modern techniques of polling and television advertisements. (Perhaps his most memorable spot featured talking fish praising his efforts to clean up the state's waterways.)

Rockefeller took to life as governor as happily as he embraced the campaign trail. He proved to be a natural at the wheeling and dealing of the legislative process, working well with both Democrats and Republicans. He was fortunate to govern mostly in a time of prosperity, when an economic boom was sending a flood of revenue into the state treasury. Among his achievements were:

- A vast expansion of the State University of New York;
- The nation's most generous Medicaid program;
- The nation's first state department of environmental conservation;
- The Pure Waters Act, a pioneering effort at water pollution control;
- The nation's first state arts council;
- The first state-level minimum wage; and
- A major expansion of the state park system.

But his long list of accomplishments loomed less lustrous by the mid-1970s, when both the city and state of New York fell into deep fiscal trouble.

Nelson Rockefeller's First Flirtation with the White House

Richard Nixon appeared to be the overwhelming frontrunner for the Republican presidential nomination in 1960. His leading rival, Senate Republican Leader William Knowland, destroyed his political career in 1958 through an ill-conceived race for governor of California. But Rockefeller's triumph in an otherwise Democratic year made him an instant rival to Nixon. There was also much speculation about a potential Nixon-Rockefeller ticket. The national media, much of it based in New York, and eager for a contested GOP race, also hyped Rockefeller's chances. In late 1959, Rockefeller made the rounds of Republican events around the nation, in what was widely seen as a prelude to a presidential campaign. He was received politely, but no more. Nixon had spent eight years wooing the Republican base, while Rockefeller lacked the same grounds for loyalty. He was also already seen as a liberal, out of step with the party faithful. On December 26, Rockefeller announced that he would not seek the presidency. He made it clear that he had no interest in the vice presidency either.

In the spring of 1960, Rockefeller's interest in the national stage revived. The economy had slipped into recession. The "sit-in" movement was pushing civil rights to the forefront of national attention. (Rockefeller had long been an advocate for a more vigorous role for the federal government in managing the economy. Following his family's tradition, Rockefeller backed civil rights legislation with great intensity.) The U-2 incident embarrassed Eisenhower.²¹ Rockefeller began to toy with the idea of a presidential draft, even though his advisers told him that he had almost no chance of winning the nomination, especially given that Nixon had swept the primaries. He called Eisenhower's foreign policy excessively cautious, even though that put him at odds with the nation's most popular Republican. (Rockefeller introduced the idea of a "missile gap," that the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union in the nuclear arms race. John F. Kennedy embraced this theme in his own presidential campaign, despite it not being supported by the evidence.)

On June 8, Rockefeller issued a "statement of conscience." He called for much more spending on both the military and on civil defense. He said that Republicans needed to more clearly embrace the civil rights movement. He also proposed a greater federal role in health care and education. Not surprisingly, this statement annoyed Eisenhower and Nixon, although they kept their doubts private. Rockefeller supporters prepared to launch a draft effort at the convention. The vast majority of delegates were committed to Nixon, but Rockefeller backers thought that they could be persuaded that only the New York governor could win in November. Nixon did not actually think Rockefeller had a chance of winning the nomination, but he increasingly feared a divisive convention that would embarrass him.

On July 22, Rockefeller warned that he might launch a floor fight at the convention if the platform was not changed to fit his demands. Fearing a damaging civil war among Republicans, former Attorney General Herbert Brownell arranged for Nixon and Rockefeller to meet immediately. At Rockefeller's insistence, the gathering took place over dinner at his Fifth Avenue apartment. Eager to win Rockefeller's support, Nixon flew to New York from Washington, without consulting with his advisers. After trading Washington stories over lamb chops, Nixon offered Rockefeller the vice presidency. Once again, Rockefeller turned down the offer, saying that he did not want to serve as standby equipment. They then reviewed the proposed Republican platform, as well as Rockefeller's suggested changes. Their policy differences on civil rights and health care were not great; both men were stronger backers of civil rights than was Eisenhower and both men were comfortable with an activist federal government. Nixon was more reluctant to call for a huge increase in defense spending, not out of principle, but because he did not want to break publicly with Eisenhower. But at midnight, the two men called platform committee chairman Charles Percy in his Chicago hotel room and gave him the altered platform language. In the morning, Rockefeller's press office announced the meeting and declared that it had been Nixon's idea. To the casual observer, Nixon looked like he had begged for Rockefeller's support.

Eisenhower felt insulted by the proposed platform changes, which implied that he had let his fiscal conservatism damage America's national security. Conservatives and southerners were also upset, especially by the new civil rights language. If journalists dubbed the meeting "The Compact of Fifth Avenue," Barry Goldwater called it a "Republican Munich," recalling the prewar appeasement of Adolf Hitler. When the platform committee rejected the Nixon-Rockefeller language, the two men lobbied the committee fiercely. The battle over the civil rights plank, which pitted southerners like Senate candidate John Tower against Rockefeller's New Yorkers, prefigured the divisions of 1964. Although Nixon and Rockefeller mostly won the battle over the platform, conservatives were left feeling betrayed. The growing number of southern Republicans would forever see Nelson Rockefeller as their confirmed enemy. Many conservatives groused later that Rockefeller did too little to help Nixon to win in the fall. Rockefeller himself blamed Nixon's loss on spending too much time courting white southerners.

Rockefeller's experience in 1960 reflected many of the factors that would keep him from winning the presidency. He showed little connection to the Republican grassroots, particularly movement conservatives. He alienated people who had showed him some good will, particularly Eisenhower and Nixon, who both seemed to desire a Nixon-Rockefeller ticket. He seemed unable to either fully commit to a presidential run or to abandon it.^{22,23,24,25}

Rockefeller the Front-Runner

Despite his tense relationships with other leading Republicans, Nelson Rockefeller became the party's front-runner for the 1964 presidential nomination. Indeed, the first two years of the Kennedy administration marked the only period of his career when Rockefeller appeared likely to be the GOP's standard bearer. Even though his policy differences with John F. Kennedy were small, Rockefeller took on the role of Republican attack dog. An even more ardent Cold War warrior than the man in the White House, Rockefeller called for more civil defense measures precisely so that the United States could more credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons. Even though Rockefeller's record in New York did not give him credibility as an economic conservative, he nonetheless advocated tax cuts bigger than Kennedy's, and he warned that JFK's proposed Department of Urban Affairs would concentrate too much power in Washington. But Rockefeller seemed most convincing in attacking Kennedy for inaction on civil rights. The Rockefeller family had advocated for African American rights for decades, while John F. Kennedy was a relative newcomer to the issue. Nelson Rockefeller had warmer relations with both Martin Luther King Jr. and Jackie Robinson than Kennedy did. He could boast of pushing for stronger antidiscrimination laws in New York State, while bashing Kennedy for coddling southern Democrats.^{26, 27, 28}

Rockefeller tried to speak as a leader of the entire Republican Party. He played down his real differences with the GOP Right. He had regular breakfasts with Senator Barry Goldwater, who told his ideological comrades that Rockefeller was more conservative than they thought. But movement conservatives continued to distrust the New York governor. His big-taxing, big-spending, big-borrowing record in office certainly gave them reason for skepticism. If Rockefeller's anticommunism was as fervent as that of any *National Review* writer, he also had a penchant for dreamy internationalism that made him the subject of right-wing conspiracy theories. But perhaps it was Rockefeller's passionate support for civil rights that most annoyed the Right. Most conservative thinkers saw the future of the GOP in the South and were happy to have Democrats embrace racial integration if it drove Dixie closer to the Republicans.

A Battle for the Soul of the GOP

The spring and summer of 1963 marked the end of Rockefeller's rein as GOP front-runner and perhaps of his plausibility as a Republican nominee under any circumstances. Rockefeller and his first wife had divorced in March 1962, after years of unhappy wedlock (and obsessive womanizing on his part). It created a public outcry, but Rockefeller's political standing recovered before long. But in May 1963, he married Margaretta Fidler "Happy" Murphy,

a onetime assistant and family friend. She was more than two decades younger than Rockefeller, had divorced her husband recently, and had given up custody of her children to her husband. The condemnation of Rockefeller's remarriage crossed partisan and cultural lines but seemed especially intense among the GOP rank and file. He lost his previous polling lead over Barry Goldwater. Even though Rockefeller did not abandon his campaign (he formally announced his candidacy in November 1963), party moderates began to look elsewhere. Richard Nixon, 1960 vice presidential nominee Henry Cabot Lodge, Pennsylvania governor William Scranton, and Michigan governor George Romney were all subject to speculation as the GOP candidate. Any of these figures could plausibly win the support of Dwight Eisenhower, who made it clear he had little use for either Rockefeller or Goldwater.

Other events also diminished Rockefeller's chances at the Republican nomination. On June 11, John F. Kennedy announced his support for what would become the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This followed several months when Kennedy was increasingly seen as a champion of racial integration. Rockefeller had long criticized Kennedy for moving too slowly on civil rights. This critique of Kennedy was no longer politically viable. Increasingly, Republicans saw more advantage in attacking national Democrats for moving too fast. African Americans were now part of the Democratic base, and even a longtime civil rights champion like Rockefeller was not likely to pull them away. Not coincidentally, the conservative movement within the GOP was growing rapidly. Following a year and a half of covert organization, the National Draft Goldwater Committee went public on April 8. Goldwater supporters increasingly dominated Republican gatherings. Encouraged by party liberals, Rockefeller delivered a fiery address on July 14. He called conservatives a "radical, well-financed, and highly disciplined minority" that appealed to racism. The address backfired, ending his relationship with Goldwater and other conservatives, without winning over moderates. Rockefeller no longer appeared a plausible unifying figure for Republicans. He was now a leader of a faction—a faction that increasingly seemed like a minority.

Arguably, Rockefeller was now a liability to Republican moderates. Unlike figures like Lodge or Scranton, he appeared unacceptable to conservatives. His remarriage made him personally offensive to millions of Republican voters. But Rockefeller continued to seek the nomination. He campaigned enthusiastically in New Hampshire, giving voters in the Granite State a taste of the handshaking and backslapping New Yorkers had experienced. Huge spending (mostly fueled by family money) made his ads inescapable on local television. But a visibly pregnant Happy accompanied him on the campaign trail, reminding voters of his remarriage. Fortunately for Rockefeller, Barry Goldwater proved to be a gaffe machine, issuing alarming statements on topics ranging from Social Security to nuclear war. Many New Hampshire Republicans found themselves wishing for another choice. A group of Boston-based operatives

launched a write-in campaign for Henry Cabot Lodge. Lodge was half a world away, serving as ambassador to South Vietnam, but he did nothing to discourage the effort. The Lodge team pulled off a shocking upset, winning 35 percent to Goldwater's 22 percent, Rockefeller's 21 percent, and 16 percent for Nixon as a write-in. Suddenly, Lodge was hailed as the front-runner, despite not having announced his candidacy.

Armed with a massive campaign staff and an advertising budget to match, Rockefeller fought on. With many moderate Republicans, Oregon looked like an inviting target. Lodge and Nixon were both on the ballot and had informal campaign apparatuses, despite not being technically in the race. Goldwater barely visited the state. But Rockefeller barnstormed throughout Oregon, giving rise to his slogan, "He Cares Enough to Come." Rockefeller won in Oregon, effectively ending Lodge's undeclared campaign. Meanwhile, Goldwater continued to roll up huge margins among delegates chosen in nonprimary states.²⁹

Both Rockefeller and Goldwater understood that California was likely to be a key primary. Goldwater had a large enough lead among delegates chosen in nonprimary states, that a California win would probably lock up the nomination. A Rockefeller win would mean a deadlocked convention that might select another moderate such as Nixon or Scranton. Goldwater benefited from a fervent base of conservative volunteers. Early polls showed him with a clear lead over Rockefeller. But Rockefeller had his huge financial resources, which allowed him to hire Stu Spencer and Bill Roberts, California's top Republican consultants. He enjoyed the support of the state's business and political establishments, and the endorsements of nearly all the state's newspapers. The campaign turned nasty, with Goldwater volunteers making violent threats against Rockefeller, and the Rockefeller campaign issuing literature warning that Goldwater could not be trusted with nuclear weapons. But Rockefeller refused to run a TV documentary, produced by Spencer and Roberts, that associated Goldwater with right-wing extremism. His advisers convinced him that the program was too intense and would backfire.³⁰

Showing his typical indecision, Eisenhower issued a statement that appeared to oppose Goldwater, but then said he did not mean to single him out. Rockefeller's vast resources allowed him to dominate the airwaves, but the campaign decided to ease off spending in the last days, given that Rockefeller had jumped to a lead in polls. Meanwhile, Goldwater launched a last-minute ad blitz. That may have made the difference as Goldwater edged out Rockefeller, 51 percent to 49 percent. But some political observers preferred another explanation: Happy giving birth to Nelson Rockefeller Jr. just three days before the primary.

With his defeat in California, Rockefeller's chances of winning the nomination evaporated. He joined moderates in seeking to stop Goldwater somehow, but the Arizona senator's delegate lead made that improbable. Goldwater's decision to vote against passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 increased

moderate determination to fight his nomination but did not make the mathematics any easier. Scranton, so hesitant about entering the race that wags dubbed him the "Hamlet of Harrisburg," finally announced his candidacy a month before the convention. Rockefeller transferred to him his campaign organization (but not his delegates). He allied with Scranton in pushing for three platform planks: one supporting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one declaring that only the president could order a nuclear attack, and one denouncing extremism on both the Left and Right. Rockefeller spoke to the convention in support of the antiextremism plank. The delegates responded with boos and chants of "We Want Barry." All of the planks backed by Scranton and Rockefeller failed. In the end, the atmosphere was so poisonous that Goldwater refused to accept Rockefeller's phone call congratulating him on winning the nomination. Rockefeller hedged on backing Goldwater in the general election, finally endorsing him in an unenthusiastic joint appearance in September.

Rockefeller's political career would always be defined by the 1964 campaign, marking him as a symbol of the defeat of moderates within the GOP. His actions during the campaign, the convention, and afterward further deepened conservatives' distrust. By contrast, Nixon, who shared Rockefeller's views on most issues, and who was also eager to deny Goldwater the nomination, accepted the conservative triumph. He not only campaigned for Goldwater, but he stumped for Republicans of all stripes, who would remember his help in the hour of need.^{31,32}

Rockefeller's failure in 1964 had multiple fathers. The scandal of his divorce and remarriage alienated many rank-and-file Republican voters. His moderate-to-liberal record in New York State appealed to many swing voters, but not the party base. Throughout his two decades of seeking the GOP presidential nomination, he never showed much affinity for Republican activists outside the Northeast. Before the spring of 1963, when Rockefeller appeared to be a consensus front-runner, the GOP faithful might have begrudgingly accepted him as the nominee. But after Rockefeller stumbled, they saw little reason to help him regain his footing. Dwight Eisenhower did not want to see Barry Goldwater as the nominee. But Rockefeller's years of criticism of Ike's record in the White House made it difficult for the ex-president to back him for his old office. The constituencies that were friendliest to Rockefeller—organized labor, the national media, the civil rights community—were either outside the Republican Party or opposed to it.

But Rockefeller's biggest obstacle was the rising conservative movement. Thousands of activists were willing to work to claim the GOP for Barry Goldwater. Strategists like F. Clifton White and William Rusher were able to wrest control of the nomination apparatus from the Republican establishment. Far more than any other moderate Republican, Nelson Rockefeller served as a demon figure for the conservative movement. He taxed, spent, and borrowed. He embraced the civil rights movement. He supported the United Nations.

He pursued a scandalous personal life. He lived on Fifth Avenue. He even liked modern art. If Nelson Rockefeller didn't exist, the conservatives of the South and West would have had to invent him. Meanwhile, the "Eastern Establishment" that had backed Dewey and Eisenhower had lost its grip on the GOP.

At the Center of a Tumultuous Year

Goldwater's nomination remade the GOP in a fashion that marginalized Rockefeller. Movement conservatives were now central to the party's identity. White southerners seemed like the GOP's future. African Americans deserted the Republicans nearly entirely. Richard Nixon was not a movement conservative or a southerner, but he was willing to appease these groups, and he no longer had much hope for the GOP's prospects among black voters.

In the aftermath of the 1964 election, Rockefeller declared that he had no interest in running for president again. Instead, he backed Michigan governor George Romney for the nomination in 1968. Romney lacked Rockefeller's personal baggage (indeed the devout Mormon struck many journalists as self-righteous), but his relationships with movement conservatives were not much warmer. Although most savvy observers doubted Rockefeller had completely given up his desires for the White House, his abandonment of national politics stood in sharp contrast to the endless hours Nixon spent on the rubber-chicken circuit.

Even as Lyndon Johnson pursued a Great Society in Washington, Nelson Rockefeller built his own version in Albany. Having forsaken the pursuit of the Republican presidential nomination, and with the Johnson landslide having given Democrats temporary control of the New York State legislature, two important constraints had come off Rockefeller's big-spending habits. He imposed New York's first sales tax. Spending on welfare and public housing soared. Most consequentially, New York adopted an especially generous and expensive Medicaid program that would bust state budgets for decades to come.

As the 1966 election approached, Rockefeller looked like an underdog for reelection. Prominent Democrats led him in polls, and some Republicans looked around for possible replacements at the top of the ticket. Conservatives were still annoyed by Rockefeller's treatment of Goldwater in 1964 and by his divorce and remarriage. Liberals thought his spending programs did not go far enough and felt his law-and-order approach to the problems of crime and drug abuse was simple-minded. Newly elected New York mayor John Lindsay challenged him for leadership of moderate and liberal Republicans. The two men, not terribly far apart on policy substance, had dramatically different political styles, and feuded frequently. New Yorkers of all stripes were annoyed by his breaking of a no-tax-increase pledge and by his continuing flirtations with the White House.

Rockefeller responded to these challenges in his usual big-spending, ideologically ambiguous, fashion. When polls found that New Yorkers were unaware of his accomplishments as governor, but were weary of his larger-than-life personality, the campaign launched a series of television ads entitled "Governor Rockefeller for Governor." These touted his achievements in areas from highway construction to environmental protection, but never showed Rockefeller himself. He pounded away at Democratic nominee Frank O'Connor, telling liberals he was a machine hack, while warning conservatives that the former prosecutor was actually soft on crime. Rockefeller beat O'Connor by a 45 percent to 38 percent margin, his closest race as governor, with significant votes going to minor-party candidates.

The national Republican wave in 1966 created optimism about the party recapturing the White House, as well as excitement about a new set of GOP stars. California governor Ronald Reagan replaced Goldwater as the leader of the conservative movement. Several newly elected Republicans challenged Rockefeller for the leadership of the party's moderate-to-liberal wing: Lindsay, Senator Charles Percy (R-IL), Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR), Maryland governor Spiro Agnew. But Romney, once the GOP frontrunner, saw his support sag. Comfortable with domestic issues, Romney often seemed out of his depth on foreign policy, especially the Vietnam War. In an interview on a Detroit TV show in August 1967, Romney explained his increasing dovishness by saying he had experienced a "brainwashing" by the military brass during a visit to Vietnam. Romney was almost laughed out of the race, and his withdrawal in February 1968 seemed anticlimactic, given Nixon's massive polling lead.

To the surprise of few, Rockefeller's interest in the presidency revived in 1967. Most savvy observers thought his backing of Romney had always been more strategic than sincere. Republican governors—most of them relatively moderate—looked for a champion as Romney's fortunes waned. Nixon was branded as a "loser," while Reagan was tied to an ideology that many thought had been discredited by Goldwater's defeat. None of the new breed of moderates was able to establish himself as a front-runner. Rockefeller seemed an appealing alternative. Savvy observers talked of a Rockefeller-Reagan ticket, despite the two men having little in common except an expressed lack of interest in the vice presidency.

Romney's withdrawal from the race created an opportunity for Rockefeller to announce his candidacy. While Nixon was dominating the primaries, Rockefeller and his circle thought that he could still win the nomination at the convention, in part by arguing for his greater electability. (It had worked for Dwight Eisenhower in 1952 and for Wendell Willkie in 1940.) But a meeting with Republican members of Congress seems to have convinced Rockefeller that party regulars mostly wanted him to run in order to heighten the effect of any Nixon primary victories. A poll in Oregon—again a key primary

state—showed Nixon leading. (Nixon himself was more worried about Reagan, since he was confident that Rockefeller could not win the nomination.) On March 21, Rockefeller announced he would not seek the presidency, shocking the press, and humiliating Agnew. The Maryland governor had asked local journalists to join him in watching what he had assumed would be the kickoff to a campaign that would feature him as a key supporter. (Before long, Agnew would be lunching with Nixon, complaining of his maltreatment by Rockefeller.) Many moderate Republicans decided that Nixon was both inevitable and acceptable, and switched their allegiances to him.

Just like eight years before, Rockefeller experienced second thoughts about not running. Lyndon Johnson urged him to seek the presidency, even promising him that he would not campaign against him should he become the Republican nominee. He seems to have been genuinely concerned that Nixon could not win a general election, and if he did, would be a poor president. Rockefeller saw Nixon as a shallow opportunist bereft of a policy vision; Nixon, in turn, perceived Rockefeller as a self-absorbed elitist unwilling to be a team player.

On April 30, Rockefeller announced that he had changed his mind and he was going to run for president after all. That same day, he won the Massachusetts primary as a write-in. Despite this win, his campaign got off to a poor start. Rockefeller was more interested in the details of public policy than in the mechanics of delegate selection. If he had understood the nomination process better, he might have realized that it was much too late to stop Nixon. After Robert Kennedy's assassination in June, Rockefeller gained a new sense of mission, but one that did little to help him win the nomination. He identified himself with the slain senator's cause and gained the support of some of his backers; indeed, he made a special effort to reach out to African Americans, many of whom indeed admired both RFK and Rockefeller. But most Republican voters and activists were less concerned with fixing the problems of the ghettos than with maintaining law and order. A lifelong hawk, Rockefeller attempted to embrace the antiwar movement. As a result, Rockefeller saw his support rise among Democrats and Independents—but fall among Republicans. It did not help that he seemed to spend more time attacking Nixon than the Democratic administration.

Ronald Reagan was conducting his own presidential campaign, though without actually entering the race. Despite the two men's obvious differences on issues, savvy members of both teams understood that their only hope was to work together to keep Nixon from winning on the first ballot. Each candidate appealed to groups that had little use for the other. Reagan had an especially strong bond with southern Republicans; Nixon feared this challenge, leading him to make assurances to Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) that he would not pursue civil rights enforcement too vigorously.

When they arrived in Miami Beach for the Republican national convention, the Rockefeller campaign's main message was "Rocky Can Win," which was supported by months of survey data. But a new Gallup Poll showed Nixon performing better than Rockefeller against the most likely Democratic nominees. The delegate math looked difficult for the Rockefeller-Reagan coalition. But Rockefeller thought that "favorite sons" would hold several northern states against Nixon. Reagan, who was finally officially in the race, aimed to win over southern delegates, many of whom privately preferred him to Nixon. But Senator Thurmond told them of Nixon's promises to him and warned, "a vote for Reagan is a vote for Rockefeller." In the end, Nixon's southern support held fast, while Rockefeller's "favorite son" strategy collapsed when some New Jersey and Pennsylvania delegates backed Nixon. Nixon won on the first ballot and picked Agnew, so humiliated by Rockefeller, as his running mate. Even if the alliance with Reagan had succeeded in blocking Nixon, Rockefeller's path to the nomination remained difficult. Conservatives might grudgingly accept Nixon, but they still despised Rockefeller. Moderates might distrust Nixon, but they generally could live with him as the nominee. Rockefeller also lacked the relationships with Republican politicians and the respect of the Republican grassroots that Nixon had developed over two decades of relentless politicking. Rockefeller left the convention feeling embittered, but overcame his anger enough to stump for Nixon with far more enthusiasm than he had ever shown for Goldwater.

Rockefeller and Nixon: Allies at Last

Despite their mutual disdain, Rockefeller developed a working relationship with Nixon during the Californian's time in the White House. Rockefeller increasingly understood that his own Oval Office ambitions could only be realized by cultivating the good will of the new president. In turn, Nixon respected Rockefeller's political acumen and his power in New York State. Although Nixon passed over Rockefeller for his cabinet, he nonetheless appointed numerous Rockefeller loyalists in key positions. Henry Kissinger became national security adviser. John N. Mitchell, Nixon's law partner and campaign manager, but also a longtime Rockefeller ally, became attorney general. Nixon's speech-writing staff included William Safire, who had worked for Rockefeller in 1964, and Raymond Price, last editorial page chief for the always Rockefeller-friendly *New York Herald Tribune*. New York's educator commissioner, James Allen, took a similar post under Nixon. Nancy Hanks, a longtime Rockefeller protégé (and onetime mistress), took over the National Endowment for the Arts. Nixon's generally centrist domestic policy often followed Rockefeller's lead: the Environmental Protection Agency owed much to New York's Department of Environmental Conservation.

In turn, Rockefeller allied himself closely with Nixon. Shedding his brief guise as a dove, Rockefeller was a loyal supporter of Nixon's foreign policy (much of it devised by his longtime sidekick Kissinger). He took on a lengthy mission to his longtime stomping ground of Latin America in May and June 1969. If the trip sometimes subjected Rockefeller to criticism for his coziness with authoritarian regimes, it certainly showed his willingness to be a team player at last. Rockefeller's political strategies paralleled Nixon's. Both backed crackdowns on crime, drugs, and campus unrest. Rockefeller's successful 1970 reelection campaign rested on winning blue-collar Catholics; Nixon did the same in 1972.

Fiscal pressures on New York, in part due to Rockefeller's own programs, pushed the governor to embrace Nixon's "New Federalism." Rockefeller was especially enthusiastic about block grants and "revenue sharing," two schemes to give states more access to federal funds. Pressure from conservative Republicans in the state legislature pushed Rockefeller to the right on spending and welfare reform. But he was still willing to break with conservatives on some issues: in 1970, Rockefeller signed a liberalized abortion law. Two years later, he vetoed an attempt to overturn it.

The reconciliation between Nixon and Rockefeller culminated in the president's 1972 campaign. Rockefeller lent staff to Nixon, placed his name in nomination at the Republican Convention, and controlled the president's organization in New York State. For the first time in three presidential campaigns, Nixon carried New York, winning an impressive 59 percent of the vote. Surely, now that Rockefeller had showed his loyalty to the GOP and his willingness to accommodate conservatives, he had won the right to the presidential nomination.

As Rockefeller wooed the Right, however, he lost the admiration he once enjoyed from liberals. The antiwar movement saw little to admire in the patron of Henry Kissinger. Baby boomers who rebelled at hierarchy distrusted Rockefeller's authoritarian style, which got crankier and more inflexible as he aged. His increasingly hard line on crime and welfare lost him much of the affection he had once enjoyed from the civil rights movement. In September 1971, prisoners seized control of the Attica Correctional Facility in western New York and took 42 officers and civilians hostages. After four days of negotiation, Rockefeller ordered the state police to seize the prison. Twenty-nine prisoners and 10 guards died in the ensuing battle. In January 1973, Rockefeller, always concerned about drug abuse, called for sentencing dealers in hard drugs to lengthy sentences in prison. After months of heavy lobbying, Rockefeller's proposal became law in May. The state's prison population exploded. Subsequent governors rolled back the law's penalties, and for later generations the "Rockefeller law" became synonymous with a draconian, inflexible approach to the drug problem.

After Nixon's reelection triumph, Rockefeller appeared to be one of the four leading contenders for the 1976 Republican nomination, along with Reagan, Agnew, and former treasury secretary John Connally (Nixon's favorite, but still a nominal Democrat). Nixon appointed Rockefeller to head the National Commission on Critical Choices for Americans (yet another high-minded blue-ribbon commission) and the National Commission on Water Quality. Rockefeller was tired of the governorship, ready to focus on his next presidential run, and wanted to give the long-serving Malcolm Wilson a head start on the 1974 election. In December 1973, Rockefeller announced that he was quitting the governorship in order to chair the two commissions.

Vice President Rockefeller

By this point, Nixon was deep into the Watergate scandal. Rockefeller was publicly supportive of Nixon, while privately he felt his longstanding doubts about the president had been vindicated. When Vice President Agnew resigned in October 1973 due to an unrelated scandal, there was speculation that Rockefeller would be appointed to replace him as vice president. But conservative skepticism made that unlikely, and Nixon instead chose House Republican Leader Gerald Ford. On August 17, eight days after Nixon's resignation, Ford offered the vice presidency to Rockefeller. Against the advice of some of his aides, Rockefeller accepted the offer. Ford had promised Rockefeller that he would play a role in domestic policy comparable to Kissinger's in foreign policy. Instead, the vice presidency would mark the end of Rockefeller's political career.

Rockefeller's ability to alienate both the Left and the Right appeared once again. Conservatives were enraged especially since Ford had not yet said he would run for president in his own right. A Vice President Rockefeller might have the inside track for the GOP nomination in 1976. His confirmation hearings held by a Democratic Congress proved more confrontational than expected. After he finally took office, Rockefeller soon discovered that his long lack of interest in the vice presidency had real justification. White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld soon emerged as Rockefeller's rival, blocking his access to Ford and winning battles over staff. Rockefeller offered a wide variety of ideas on jobs, health care, and energy. He even suggested buying Greenland from Denmark for its supposed mineral riches. But Ford and Rumsfeld were more interested in holding down government spending.

New York City's fiscal crisis heightened the conflict between Rockefeller and the rest of the Ford administration. To conservatives like Treasury Secretary William Simon, Rockefeller was a symbol of an out-of-control, fiscally reckless liberalism. Echoing his experiences under Eisenhower, Rockefeller found himself out of step with a basically conservative administration. He

fought with the Right on Capitol Hill as well, where as president of the Senate, Rockefeller helped enact filibuster reform and a strong renewal of the Voting Rights Act, causes backed by liberals in both parties.

By the summer of 1975, talk was growing that Rockefeller would be dropped from the ticket. Ronald Reagan was gearing up to challenge Ford for the nomination from the Right. In July, Ford's campaign manager declared Rockefeller to be Ford's leading political problem. Polls showed Rockefeller hurting Ford with many Republican voters. On October 28, Ford asked Rockefeller to withdraw. Although Rockefeller would provide some assistance to Ford's winning the nomination, his political career was essentially over.

After he returned to New York in January 1977, Rockefeller made it clear he had lost all interest in politics. His efforts to assert dominance over the family philanthropies led to conflict with his brother John III and a new rising generation of Rockefellers. Nelson Rockefeller died suddenly on January 26, 1979. Tributes to his years of public service and contemplations of his leadership of GOP liberals turned into sniggers when it was revealed that he had died in the intimate company of a young female assistant.

Winthrop: The Ozarks Rockefeller

Winthrop emerged early as the "black sheep" of the Rockefeller brothers. As a young man, he felt more comfortable working as an oil field roughneck or commanding troops in the South Pacific than serving in the family enterprises. Winthrop was best known for a hedonistic lifestyle that included womanizing, heavy drinking, and an expensive and high-profile divorce. He certainly did not fit in with his father's Puritanism or with his brothers' world of philanthropy and power.

In 1953, a visit to an army friend in Arkansas changed Winthrop's life. He soon moved to the state, where he established Winrock Farms, a cattle ranch that gained world renown. In 1955, Governor Orval Faubus named him as the first chairman of Arkansas Industrial Development Commission. Winthrop courted industry vigorously for his impoverished new home state, while his philanthropy gained him the respect he had previously lacked.

Winthrop found himself turning against his patron Orval Faubus. The governor's vehement defense of racial segregation clashed with the Rockefeller's long support for civil rights. Winthrop's loyal Republicanism led him to seek to bring two-party politics to staunchly Democratic Arkansas. In 1964, Winthrop challenged Faubus for reelection; the incumbent governor beat the Yankee billionaire by 57 percent to 43 percent—but that was still the best performance by a Republican in an Arkansas gubernatorial election since Reconstruction.³³

Two years later, Winthrop defeated segregationist Democrat Jim Johnson to be elected Arkansas's first Republican governor in nearly a century. Facing

a legislature both conservative and almost entirely Democratic, Winthrop was often frustrated as governor. But he nonetheless produced numerous accomplishments: reform of the state's notorious prison system, a freedom of information law, a state minimum wage, and improved insurance regulation. His staunch support for civil rights made for a stark contrast with Faubus's segregationism. Winthrop was the only southern governor to hold a public ceremony to mourn Martin Luther King Jr.'s death. His governorship was seen by many as the point when Arkansas joined the "New South."

Winthrop won reelection in 1968, against Marion Crank, a rural-based conservative Democrat. But his second term was unproductive, and his increasingly visible alcoholism and the public breakdown of his second marriage appeared to distract him from official duties. In 1970, he was defeated for reelection by Dale Bumpers, a Democratic lawyer new to politics and free from segregationist baggage. Winthrop Rockefeller died of pancreatic cancer in February 1973, but his family philanthropy continues to benefit Arkansas.

David Rockefeller

Although he briefly worked for New York mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, David Rockefeller spent his professional life in finance, rising to be president (1961–1969) and chairman (1969–1981) of Chase Manhattan Bank. (When he joined Chase, it was headed by his uncle Winthrop Aldrich; it also had long ties to Standard Oil and to the Rockefeller family more broadly.) But even as he built a career in banking, he also became a force in foreign affairs, serving on the boards of think tanks, and welcome in the offices of heads of states. He served as chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations for 15 years.³⁴ Three times David was offered the position as secretary of the treasury, and his brother Nelson once offered to appoint him to the U.S. Senate to fill a vacancy. He turned down all these proposals. His influence arguably peaked during the Nixon and Ford administrations, assisted by the family's long relationship with Henry Kissinger, who had been Nelson's longtime foreign policy adviser, and served in the same role to Nixon and Ford. David's contacts around the world, particularly in the Middle East and Latin America, made him a valuable partner for the White House. His relationship with President Jimmy Carter was cooler. Carter was a self-proclaimed outsider, while David was a quintessential enough insider to have founded the Trilateral Commission.³⁵ The fraught state of the relationship between the two men was exemplified by David's repeated attempts in 1979 to help bring the disposed Shah of Iran to the United States for medical treatment. When the Shah was finally admitted, Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, precipitating the crisis that would dominate the rest of Carter's presidency. After David's retirement in 1981, he spent three decades as an elder statesman, welcome in presidential palaces and executive suites around the world.³⁶

The Other Brothers

Although he was overshadowed by his younger brother Nelson, eldest son John D. Rockefeller III nonetheless made his mark as the leading philanthropist among the brothers. John III chaired the Rockefeller Foundation for 20 years, served as a leading spokesman for the nonprofit sector, and sought to strengthen U.S.-Asian relations. He also served as a leading figure behind the construction of the Lincoln Center cultural complex in New York City, which helped make him a prominent voice for arts funding. But he did not attract wide public attention until he became a vocal advocate of population control in the 1960s and 1970s, when Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon appointed him to chair commissions on the issue. John III was emerging as the most liberal of the brothers, and the only one with much sympathy for the spirit of the Age of Aquarius. This sometimes led to conflict with the Nixon White House, and with his brother Nelson. After Nelson left public life, his attempts to establish total control of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund confronted fierce resistance from John III. The fraternal battles only ended with the sudden deaths of both men in the late 1970s.

Laurance S. Rockefeller, the youngest of the brothers, devoted his life to investing and to conservatism, sometimes advising Nelson as well as several presidents on environmental issues. But his most important role was as the longtime president of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, in which capacity he loyally served Nelson.

The Cousins

By the late 1960s, the next generation of Rockefellers (often known as “the cousins”) was coming of age. In sharp contrast to the Rockefeller brothers, about two-thirds of the two dozen cousins were female, and many of them rebelled against the family’s patriarchal culture. Several Rockefeller women embraced the 1960s counterculture, funding New Left institutions such as Students for a Democratic Society and the magazine *Ramparts*, and questioning their family’s investments in defense contractors and polluting industries. Many cousins of both sexes felt ambivalent toward the Rockefeller legacy. Not surprisingly, relations between the two generations of Rockefellers turned ugly. Although some cousins entered the business world, more chose less lucrative careers, in academia, journalism, and the caring professions. As tensions relaxed after Nelson’s death, the cousins assumed roles in the family businesses and philanthropies. But few sought the world-spanning roles played by the Rockefeller brothers.

Unlike most other Rockefellers of his generation, John D. Rockefeller IV (usually known as “Jay”) chose a life in the public spotlight. Jay graduated from Harvard University in 1961. After serving in minor posts in the Kennedy

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administration, Jay Rockefeller came to West Virginia as a VISTA volunteer in 1964. Two years later, he was elected to the West Virginia House of Delegates (as a Democrat) and was elected secretary of state in 1968. Rockefeller turned down an offer from his uncle Nelson to be appointed to fill the vacancy created by the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Instead, he chose to continue building his political career in West Virginia. In a state with a long history of political corruption, he cracked down on vote-buying and other electoral fraud. He developed an enemy in the coal industry when he announced his opposition to strip mining. Many observers saw him as presidential material, perhaps in 1976.

Rockefeller challenged Republican governor Arch Moore for reelection in 1972. Moore portrayed Rockefeller as a wealthy dilettante out of touch with the humble lives of most West Virginians. He warned that Rockefeller would destroy the state’s coal industry. Heartening back to earlier generations, Moore charged that Rockefeller was part of a ruthless clan of robber barons. Moore also ran a memorable advertisement that featured New Yorkers being asked about electing a West Virginian as governor. One responded, “That makes as much sense to me as having the next Governor of West Virginia be a New Yorker.” Signs appeared around the state that simply declared, “Remember Ludlow,” recalling the 1915 massacre of coal miners in Colorado. Saddled with George McGovern heading the Democratic ticket, Rockefeller lost to Moore, 55 percent to 45 percent, a humiliating defeat for a man who had seemed destined for the White House.

Still, Rockefeller remained in the state and was elected governor in a landslide just four years later, in 1976. Serving as governor of West Virginia was less glamorous than his uncle Nelson’s tenure in Albany. He abandoned his previous opposition to strip mining. A deep recession gave West Virginia the nation’s highest unemployment rate. Rockefeller gained a reputation as an able and honest governor who was nonetheless beset by problems beyond his ability to overcome. After leaving the governor’s seat, Jay was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1984, spending \$12 million of his own money, a formidable sum in a small state.

Rockefeller gained a reputation in the Senate as a liberal who had a special interest in health care policy, and as a “workhorse” willing to master unglamorous issues relevant to West Virginia. He considered running for president in 1992, probably the only time when he could have realistically won the White House, but decided against it. He continued working on health care, coauthoring the Children’s Health Insurance Program and backing a public option as part of the Affordable Care Act. As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, he was a prominent critic of the Iraq War. Facing a challenging reelection campaign in an increasingly Republican state, and enduring increasing health problems, Senator Rockefeller announced his retirement in January 2013.

Winthrop Paul Rockefeller (known as “Win Paul”), Winthrop’s only child, was the only other Rockefeller cousin who won public office. After spending two decades managing the ranch and investments he inherited from his father, Win Paul Rockefeller was elected lieutenant governor of Arkansas in 1996. A decade later, he was preparing to seek the state’s governorship. But he was diagnosed with a rare blood disorder and died in July 2006.

Alida Ferry Rockefeller Messinger, sister of Senator Jay Rockefeller, has been a leading donor to progressive causes and the Democratic Party. She was married to Mark Dayton, a retailing heir who has served as a U.S. senator and as governor of Minnesota. Although they divorced in 1986, she has remained a Minnesotan and a supporter of Dayton’s political career. The next generation (the “second cousins” perhaps) has not yet produced any elected officials, but Jay’s son Justin is a politically engaged philanthropist, and Win Paul’s son Will has been mentioned as a possible Republican candidate in Arkansas.

Conclusion

The Rockefeller family, so prominent in 20th-century America, does not play the same role in this century. That shift is partially due to predictable changes. As the family has grown with each generation, the fortune has become more fragmented. If the Rockefeller brothers embraced public life, the following generations have mostly chosen to keep a low profile. New technologies have produced new billionaires. Perhaps the late 21st century will see Bezoses and Zuckerbergs in high office? But the decline of the Rockefellers also may reflect broader shifts in American life. The Rockefellers were identified with the rise of large bureaucratic organizations—in business, government, labor, academia, and philanthropy. These organizations were staffed by experts applying the latest “scientific” techniques. There was a time when Americans had faith in bureaucracies and experts. That time has passed.

Notes

1. Ron Chernow. 1998. *Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr.* New York: Vintage Books, 556.

2. He did marry Abby Greene Aldrich, daughter of Senator Nelson W. Aldrich (R-RI). She was mostly known for her support for modern art, but her extroverted personality had a profound impact on her children, particularly Nelson.

3. For discussions of Nelson’s militant anticommunism, see Cary Reich. 1996. *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller: Worlds to Conquer, 1908–1958*. New York: Doubleday, xvi–xvii, 335–336, 448–449, 554–555; Rick Perlstein. 2001. *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus*. New York: Perseus Books, 77; Peter Collier and David Horowitz. 1976. *The Rockefeller: An American*

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about overpopulation, see John Ensor Harr and Peter J. Johnson. 1991. *The Rockefeller Conscience: An American Family in Public and in Private*. New York: Scribner’s, especially 158–179, 395–442; “the revolution of rising expectations” is a major theme of Rockefeller Brothers Fund. 1961. *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports*. New York: Doubleday; also see John Andrew III. 1998. “Cracks in the Consensus: The Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project and Eisenhower’s America.” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 535–552.

4. Perlstein 2001, 77–78, Collier and Horowitz 1976, 325–330; for Junior’s trust in expertise in pursuit of essentially conservative projects of reform and uplift, see Collier and Horowitz 1976, 139–145; Chernow 1998, 637–647; Reich 1996, 11–12; Smith 2014, 33–34.

5. Cary Reich. 1996. *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller: Worlds to Conquer, 1908–1958*. New York: Doubleday, 380.

6. Rockefeller Brothers Fund. 1961. *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports*. New York: Doubleday.

7. John Andrew III. 1998. “Cracks in the Consensus: The Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project and Eisenhower’s America.” *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 535–552.

8. Richard Norton Smith. 2014. *On His Own Terms: A Life of Nelson Rockefeller*. New York: Random House, 262.

9. Andrew 1998.

10. Smith 2014, 138–164.

11. Reich 1996, 165–264.

12. Smith 2014, 186–188.

13. Eisenhower had previously served as supreme allied commander in Europe, army chief of staff, and NATO supreme commander.

14. Smith 2014, 229–234.

15. Reich 1996, 650.

16. Smith 2014, 220.

17. Reich 1996, 609–617.

18. Smith 2014, 280.

19. Smith 2014, 264–291.

20. Reich 1996, 669–769.

21. In May 1960, the Soviet Union shot down a U-2 spy plane, which was overflying its territory, and captured its pilot. The Eisenhower administration initially stuck to its cover story that the Soviets had shot down a weather plane, but was eventually forced to concede that the U-2 was on an espionage mission. A superpower summit in Paris collapsed. The incident was widely seen as embarrassing to Eisenhower, especially since he had appeared to have been untruthful.

22. Smith 2014, 321–348.

23. Geoffrey Kabaservice. 2012. *Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, from Eisenhower to the Tea Party*. New York: Oxford University Press, 26–31.

24. Theodore H. White. 1961. *The Making of the President, 1960*. New York: Atheneum House, 70, 97, 116, 247.